We build towards a prediction of the content of the world's constitutions, conditional upon the absence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The paper, at this juncture, is one-part research design, and one-part evidence. The theory guiding the background causal mechanism is highly intuitive, so we omit it here except in summary form. We identify two empirical implications that should follow if the UDHR has, indeed, been an influential reference point for those drafting constitutions subsequent to 1948. The first -that its content has projected onto subsequent national constitutions -was the subject of a recent article by two of us (plus one). We focus our attention here on a second problem -untangling the effect of the UDHR from that of its milieu, which could plausibly be the source of ideas for both the UDHR and subsequent constitutions. Our approach is to unearth the process that produced the UDHR, which was fortunately a highly documented affair. Our investigation targets accidental elements of the process in order to trace its signature in subsequent texts.
Introduction
The classic rights documents are iconic statements of claims by which a community articulates its fundamental values. These documents-such as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)-represent major junctures in the history of human rights. They seem to consolidate ideas and shape subsequent thinking. Of course, none of these was written on a blank slate; each drew from prior attempts at higher law. And each played an important role as a menu for subsequent documents. Or so we think. A vexing analytical problem looms over this last assertion. If the major documents simply enshrine conventional wisdom at the time, then how influential were they, really? In this more skeptical reading, these documents come off as merely epiphemenal: reflections of the era rather than exogenous influences on what would come. We conceptualize this distinction as one of reflective versus formative events. We have worked on this problem recently (e.g., Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons, 2012) , and are convinced that the UDHR reflected leading ideas in mid-century constitutional thought. We are also persuaded that post-war constitutions share many ideas with the UDHR. We are less certain about the UDHR's independent role in shaping future constitutions. Our modest goal in this paper is to assemble evidence to distinguish the UDHR from the ideas in which it marinated. We use this evidence to reach for the less modest goal of assessing the formative effects of the UDHR.
Ultimately, we are interested in estimating the content and practice of human rights conditional upon the absence of the UDHR.
Reflective versus Formative Events
In previous work we presented evidence that was consistent with a view of the UDHR as both reflective and formative. Our approach was a macro-constitutional one, which leveraged original data resources (see below). In that analysis, the UDHR seemed reflective to the extent that its rights matched those of then-recently-drafted constitutions, such as the French charter of 1946. It seemed formative to the extent that its rights matched those of subsequent constitutions. These findings conformed to our (and probably most others') theoretical intuitions. 1 Our very strong hunch is that the UDHR, and its follow-up covenants, served as an important coordinating mechanism for future constitution makers. After all, constitution-makers have multiple instrumental and functional reasons for harmonizing their document with something as legitimate and authoritative as the UDHR (see Elkins 2009 ).
However, a very reasonable source of skepticism remains, one that was central to a recent and astute consideration of our conclusions (Roberts 2013) . Simply stated, we cannot fully refute the idea that the creation of the UDHR, and its subsequent legal covenants, was merely the articulation of prevailing trends in the post-WWII era -trends that also happen to be taken up in post-WWII constitutions. "Merely" in the prior sentence suggests that a reflective event can also be formative. Indeed, one might think that mirrors of conventional wisdom can be especially influential because they represent conventional wisdom. What we are saying, to be precise, is that we cannot determine in that analysis whether the UDHR happens only to share the ideas of subsequent constitutions or whether it has helped to inspire such ideas. Reflective events can also be formative events, but they are not necessarily so.
Some basic causal logic helps us tease apart these two roles and points to an analytic strategy. Assume a relevant outcome y (e.g., the provision of a particular right in post-UDHR constitutions) that we observe some time after an event x (e.g., the provision of the right in the UDHR). Provided that two conditions hold for x and y, we might suspect that x is formative.
One such condition is if event x is followed by an increase in the probability of y. A second has to do with the factors that led to the emergence of x. Assume a factor z that is some "accidental" condition unrelated to current trends or context. If event x is a product of z, whose effect-signature can be traced (through x) to y, then one should be more convinced of x's formative power. This logic is, of course, well known to those of us who wrestle everyday with endogeneity, which is to say nearly everyone who in the business of studying the consequences of institutions. The practical problem lies in finding appropriate z's with which to perform these tests, which, to use statistical terminology, amounts to a quest for adequate instruments. Can we identify exogenous/contingent factors (accidents, ideally) that led to the creation of some rights in the UDHR -factors that are not representative of the times?
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Conceptual challenges to analyzing rights (a short digression)
The analysis below is based on a set of 116 rights found in a nearly complete set of national constitutions and human rights documents since 1789. The rights are listed in the appendix below. We digress briefly here to clarify several details of our empirical approach. Our project focuses on written constitutional texts, for reasons that we elaborate in our earlier work (e.g., Elkins et al. 2009 This paper draws on the authors' data regarding the content of the world's constitutions -as thus conceptualized --a project that involves some observational and interpretive challenges. We have described our process of data collection in various places and various ways.
Here follows another summary. At the root of our project is a conceptual inventory of constitutional topics and provisions. Using this inventory, in the form of survey questions, two trained coders code each constitution and their answers are then compared and reconciled. In the event of any disagreement, a third person reviews the answers. One of the methodological challenges that we face is that constitutional texts are not self-interpreting. Judgment is required to ensure that two constitutions are in fact talking about the same thing. Consider, for example, the right to silence. Brazil's Constitution of 1988 (Art. 63) provides that the accused has a right to remain silent, as well as many other criminal procedure protections. But what about the 1858 Constitution of Nicaragua, which liberally provides that the accused "may not be compelled to answer if he refuses to do so; but his silence is presumptive evidence against him."? Is there a right to silence or not? The Brazilian language says nothing about the effect of remaining silent; the Nicaraguan language provides a right but then disincentivizes its invocation. These are not equivalent though both can be considered a species of the same right.
Also, rights are often nested in others. A right to personal autonomy might be seen as prohibiting torture and censorship; indeed, some courts have used the overarching concept of human dignity to inform constitutional interpretation, and it serves as a kind of blanket right encompassing many others.
Our effort has proceeded on the assumption that a rigorous coding protocol can minimize the measurement error introduced through interpretive ambiguity, but we have certainly not resolved every ambiguous case. There are challenges inherent in any ontology that structures data for interpretation (Noy and McGuinness 2001) . At a certain level of abstraction, things may look very similar; move the microscope a bit closer and differences become apparent. The level of generality problem is, alas, a general one in philosophy, science, and law (Samaha 2013).
We have been self-conscious about the comparability/equivalence of our measures and concepts (Melton et al. 2013; Elkins 2013 ), but there is no doubt that our view of an equivalence class will not always be the same as that of another.
In many ways, our own effort has sensitized us to the challenges faced by constitutional courts when they are called on to interpret constitutional texts. 
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The growth and spread of rights: UDHR in historical perspective
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that there has been a general expansion in the number and type of rights claims over the past two centuries. Law and Versteeg (2011) call this 2 The example of the right to bear arms shows that rights can be transformed as they endure over time.
The origins of the right to bear arms in the United States are shrouded in controversy (Shallhope 1992; Cress 1984) . Some argue that the right was originally intended to encompass an individual right to bear arms; others focus on the preamble to the right and argue that the "well-regulated militia" renders the right collective or communitarian (Cress 1984) . Some argue that the right was chiefly designed to reassure the Southern states that the militia, their chief instrument of slave control, would remain intact even as the national government gained the power to raise armies (Bogus 1998). Levinson (2009) reviews the literature and finds that it does not provide support to either side in the contemporary debate about gun regulation. Opponents and proponents of gun control each find support in text, history, structure and doctrine. Notwithstanding the vagueness of the right, it played a relatively unimportant role in U.S constitutional law for many decades. Not until 2008 did the U.S. Supreme Court ever strike down a law restricting gun ownership. District of Columbia v. Heller; McDonald v. Chicago.
"rights creep" and in other writing we used the concept of a "one-way ratchet" (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons 2013) , to suggest the additional idea of the trend's seeming irreversibility. We view this proliferation, in part, as a process of disaggregation, whereby a relatively small number of core interests (beginning with the iconic life, liberty, and estate) are gradually distinguished through a political process of claiming and evolution. It is captured, in part, by the mean number of rights from our list of 116 found in national constitutions over time.
[ Figure 1 here]
At the same time there has been continual refinement in the nature of rights claims. The
Constitution of Ecuador (2008) gained international attention for the decision to grant rights to nature herself. Other relatively recent innovations include the right to food, 3 the right to form political parties based on indigenous status, 4 and a proposed right of internet usage. 5 These rights may also be evolving with respect to how they are expressed, but we leave that aside for the moment. As we show in another paper, the emergence of new rights-claims is part of a staggered process in which particular periods are associated with greater innovation. 6 The post-WWII period, one would expect, would be just such a moment of innovation. It also seems likely that it would be a moment of norm crystallization. Consider each of these ideas.
Norm crystallization (rights-concentration).
Norm crystallization has to do with the degree to which countries converge on the set of rights that are at the core. Mathematically, it has to do with the distribution of each these rights across constitutions: whether they are concentrated or dispersed. We might consider a right "mainstreamed" in the international community if it is constitutionalized by at least half of the constitutions in force in a given year. 7 In our writing, we refer to these rights, variously, as "mainstream," "consensual," or "core" rights and the hypothetical constitution that contains all of them (and only them) as the "vanilla" constitution, an important reference point that we identify in each year under analysis.
The number of rights in the vanilla constitution changes dramatically between 1800 and 2010 (see Figure 2 , Panel A). The only core right in 1810 is freedom of press, but by 2010, 46 rights had made it over the majority threshold.
3 Found, in part in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, and South Africa, 4 Bolivia 2009, 5 Iceland's failed 2012 draft. 6 Innovation and Diffisuion in Constitutional Rights. 7 A majority is a somewhat arbitrary threshold, though it has a certain democratic resonance. Still we would see the same basic trend (a steady increase) if we adopt more or less consensual thresholds. The UDHR and the concentration and proliferation of rights. These trends correspond to our general intuition about the historical proliferation of, and convergence on, rights. But how, exactly, do these trends relate to the UDHR? In particular, we wonder whether the UDHR is coincident with a shift in these two trends. The advantage of looking at the average constitution is that rights do not need to surpass any threshold to be included; it is just a measure of the number of rights in a constitution. The disadvantage is that the average constitution fails to identify agreed upon rights; instead, it is a combination of agreed upon rights and more peripheral rights that are country-specific. As a result, the average constitution tends to include a few more rights than the median constitution, and the size of the average constitution tends to lead the size of the median constitution. Although we prefer the median constitution as an analytic construct, we provide the estimates change points from both measures in the analysis below to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
Innovation (rights-proliferation
proliferation (Panel A), the periodization is similar. One difference is that the third generation begins earlier -in the years immediately following World War II.
The UDHR (introduced in December 1948), is in the "neighborhood" of a dramatic shift in the average number of rights in constitutions, though it is clear that this shift began five years before its writing. In terms of concentration, the UDHR precedes by fifteen years a major shift in the number of highly consensual rights. One preliminary inference -though this will need to be prodded -was that the UDHR's immediate impact on rights was in expanding the number of rights that framers considered more so than in concentrating attention to a select few. This view corresponds with our view of the UDHR as a highly inclusionary model, which put a host of social and economic rights "on the map." We float this idea somewhat noncommittally, as we pursue it further. One complication with this interpretation is that constitutions are not especially responsive instruments. Their revision or replacement process only episodic and, by design, constrained. As such, it is hard to be sure of the appropriate lag of any UDHR effect.
Projection of the UDHR onto subsequent constitutions (reprise)
Here we summarize what we know about the degree to which the UDHR shares content with subsequent constitutions (an effect we summarize as its projection). In a recent paper, some of us (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons (2013) ) analyzed the projection of the UDHR on the content of subsequent constitutions. In that analysis, we also trace these effects all the way to the enforcement of rights on the ground, through some presumed legal channels: that is, from Declaration, to Covenant, to Constitution, and to the respect (or non-respect) for rights in a given country.
The data we analyzed in that article suggested some very strong projection effects. We found that the number of rights increased dramatically following 1948, as did the similarity of constitutions' rights choices to the set included in the UDHR. In an analysis at the level of the right, we found that a right's inclusion in the UDHR increased the probability of its inclusion in a subsequent constitution by 50%. The analysis controlled for the baseline popularity of the right, as measured by its inclusion in constitutions in force in 1948 as well as the age of the right.
However we could not tie these effects directly to the UDHR, or at least directly enough.
The theory supporting a UDHR role is compelling. Does anyone really dispute the idea that the UDHR could serve as an important coordinating device for drafters struggling to produce --under a deadline --universal principles that would endure for generations? Indeed, in some cases of constitutional design, the document's use by drafters can probably be documented easily enough. Nevertheless, as important as the declaration was (and is), the post-war era was a dynamic and interesting era. Conversations about human rights abounded in Universities, legislatures, radio shows, and dining rooms all over the world. New, modern rights could just have easily come from any number of sources as well as the UDHR. We also know that these new rights were enshrined in contemporary constitutions (e.g., France 1946), which may have been just as important in disseminating ideas as was the UDHR.
As one indicator of this uncertainty about the UDHR, consider Figure 3 . In that figure, we replicate a graphic from Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons (2013) , but this time with a larger set of rights (116 instead of 74) and a slightly larger sample of constitutions. We also incorporate a change-point analysis (as described above), which helps us pinpoint when, exactly, similarity to the UDHR increased. If the UDHR were formative and not reflective, we would expect similarity to it to start in 1949 or shortly therafter. In fact, our analysis -which we varied in different ways --consistently returned a different answer: 1943. This inconvenient number suggests that the transformation to UDHR-style constitutions began in earnest a full five years before Roosevelt, Cassin, Malik, and Humphrey picked up a pen. Even more inconveniently, 1943 is also the one in which we noticed a shift in the number of rights in constitutions ( Figure 2A ).
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The making of the UDHR and the search for signature elements
Here we unearth some of process-details of construction of the UDHR in order to connect any idiosyncracies to a lasting legacy. We use this information, upon which we intend to build, in order sharpen our estimate of any UDHR projection effect. Despite some suspicions that the UDHR was a kind of Western imposition, a more accurate characterization is that it reflected the culmination of a long-standing international political movement (Waltz 2002: 439), and was not simply an imposition of powerful Western states.
Crucial roles were played by Lebanon's Charles Malik and China's Peng Chun Chang in the formation of the text of the UDHR, though they were often in disagreement.
Our sense from the both the highly inclusionary and open process of its drafting, as well as our analysis of its content, is that the UDHR represented an expansive view of constitutional rights that had become popular in constitutions written in the interwar era and immediately after World War II. In our previous analysis, we compared the content of the UDHR to that of a large sample of constitutions written since 1789. We tested hypotheses that the constitutions of larger, wealthier, and politically important countries had served as models for the UDHR's drafters. We found no support for any of these hypotheses, which corroborated the characterization of the process as an inclusive one. The only robust predictor of dyadic similarity was the age of the referenced constitution: more recent constitutions were considerably more similar to the UDHR than were those drafted in earlier eras. The UDHR, we concluded, was very much a product of its time.
Still, we suspect that the document is not just a reflection of contemporary ideas about rights. The drafting of constitutional documents -like any collective writing project --is a sprawling, chaotic, and sometimes idiosyncratic process. The UDHR was no exception. Indeed, in terms of constituencies, one could not imagine a broader and more diverse one than that of the world's recognized states. Collectively written documents, as any co-author knows, can often amount to more than aggregated opinion of its authors. Our research task was/is to find elements of the process that were unique to the crafting of the UDHR and that led to particular, identifiable outcomes. These could be elements of the process that suggested a discretionary, contingent affair. Ideally, these would simple twists of fate that tipped the balance towards a particular right, or a particular expression of a right. These twists are our instruments -our z's from the illustration in beginning of this paper -with which we intend to trace the signature These drafts were not carbon copies of one another, or of the resulting UDHR, although one sees agreement among the set on a core set of rights. One summary measure of the similarity of any two rights documents is the percentage of rights (of the 116 in our data) on which they agree (either to include or to omit). In that analysis [details of which are currently
omitted here], we find that, on average, the proposals matched the UDHR's choices for 42% of our set of topics, with a high of 68% and a low of 23%. Table 1 provides a more detailed sense of these choices, with the right as the unit of analysis. The Table - rights in our data, exactly half were included in the UDHR). The summary statistics at the bottom each group of rights tells us more about the UDHR's correspondence with its proposals.
The 58 rights included in the UDHR were also included in an average of four of twelve proposals studied, as opposed to an average of less than one proposal for the 58 UDHR-excluded rights.
This right-by-right analysis also reminds us of the then-popularity of included versus excluded rights in constitutions. UDHR-included rights were found, on average, in 26% of constitutions in force in 1945 compared with 14% for excluded rights. An eyeballed comparison across columns tells us that, like the UDHR, the alternative proposals seemed steeped in the ideas prevalent in recent constitutions. Indeed, the correlation between the number of proposals in which the right was included and the popularity of the right in 1945 is 0.57. Idiosyncratic elements of the UDHR might usefully be described by, on the one hand, UDHRincluded rights that were unpopular in proposals and in extant constitutions and, on the other hand, UDHR-excluded rights that were popular in these documents. One can pick out rights from each group based on Table 1 , but we can also identify them more systematically. Consider an analysis, with rights as the unit, in which we predict the inclusion in the UDHR based on rights' popularity in proposals and extant constitutions. We can then look at the predicted scores for inclusion in UDHR and identify cases that fall off the regression line, on either side.
The predicted scores are helpful both in terms further statistical analysis, as we trace systematically the independent effect of the UDHR, but also as a sampling strategy for case studies, which we begin below. It is potentially illuminating to unpack the process by which some of the UDHR's unexpected choices emerged. We start here with two rights from each of the "subtracted" and "added" groups.
Right to life: an unexpected addition
Article 3 of the Declaration states, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person." For the human rights commission, "right to life" was hardly an abstract notion. Indeed, the atrocities of Nazi Germany were the very reason that they were meeting to draw up a document in the first place. Still, the "right to life," as a legal concept, was not something that was either well understood or that had a firm standing in constitutional law at the time. One of the joys of reading the minutes from long UN meetings is in finding gems like this exchange on May 27, 1948. One can almost hear the guffaws in the room.
Mr. Lebeau (Belgium) questioned the necessity of saying that every individual had the right to life, as in his opinion the Declaration applied only to those who were already alive.
In reply to Mr. Cassin (France), who pointed out that at a time when millions of people had been deprived of their life it was important that the Commission should raise its voice in defence and emphasis of that right, Mr. Lebeau said that in that case the wording should be "has the right to protection of his life." If the article were to be put to the vote in its present form, he would have to abstain from voting.
Mr. Pavlov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought the remarks of the Belgian representative were logical, but since no other wording had been suggested, the article would have to remain in its present form. He recalled that during the discussion of this article in the Drafting Committee he had pointed out that it lacked concreteness and was divorced from actual realities since millions of people were still dying of starvation, succumbing to epidemics and being exterminated in wars.
Mr. Lebeau (Beligium) requested that the article should be voted upon in sections.
The Chairman agreed and put to the vote the phrase: "Everyone has the right to life."
It was adopted by fourteen votes to none, with one abstention. The phrase "everyone has the right to liberty and to security of person was adopted by fifteen votes to none.
The Belgian's confusion aside, it is likely that others struggled with applications of the right outside of the totalitarian context. Indeed, it seems likely that if not for the particular juncture in which the commissioners were operating, the right to life would have gone the way of some of the other proposals that were excluded. As it is, the right to life has gone on to become one of the core rights on modern constitutions. 77% of constitutions currently include the right, compared with 27% of constitutions in force in 1945. This is an all-too-brief description of a right's journey, a description worthy of a conference paper. Nevertheless, the quick summary makes the point and provides a bookmark for more thorough historical research on the right's inclusion in future iterations.
Right to petition: an unexpected subtraction
One of the most significant, and largely accidental, omissions from the UDHR is the right to petition. The right generally refers to a citizens' prerogative to communicate with state authorities, particularly so that they may seek redress for encroachments on individual rights.
For many, this was a fundamental right that would have enabled and activated the other rights in the charter. It is also a right that was highly predicted by contemporary constitutions, if not by draft proposals. A full 75% of constitutions in force in 1945 contained the right.
(Interestingly, our data show that only one draft proposal included the right, a surprising discrepancy with the constitutional trends and one that deserves greater scrutiny. It could be that our sample of proposals is distorted, for one thing).
A review of the commission's minutes that are collected in Schabas (2013) as well as the thoughtful account by Morsink (1999: 302-307) suggests that the omission resulted from a failure to separate two strands of the provision, one which was uncontroversial (the right to petition one's government) and another that was decidedly more thorny (the right to petition the United Nations). The resistance to the idea of petitioning the United Nations took the form of two different sorts of objections, one pragmatic and the other political. On the pragmatic side, some doubted that the fledgling United Nations would have either the organizational capacity or the will to consider individual petitions from around the world. The political opposition came mostly from the Soviet Union, which viewed the idea of citizens turning to the UN to renounce their home country as a threat to state sovereignty. A further complication was that some commissioners saw the right as incorporating aspects of legal implementation, a component of the human rights project that they had agreed to consider separately.
Regardless of these differences, the basic right to petition was one that most had intended to include, and Morsink views its omission as an organizational and administrative error. He writes: "Considering the time pressures under which the drafters worked, it is amazing how few of these kinds of errors they made." The critical "error" appeared to come, from our reading, in the 78 th meeting of the commission on June 17, 1948. That day, the commission -having failed to reach consensus about the international component of the petition --voted to table the matter and flag it for later discussion. In fact, they voted to place it in a rather vulnerable position -listed, but not numbered, as one of the declaration's rights. The minutes from that day read:
The Commission decided, by 12 votes to 1 with 1 abstention, to retain the article and to place it, unnumbered, at the end of the Declaration, with a note as suggested by the United Kingdom representative [a note suggesting its connection to implementation] (Schabas 2013 (Schabas : 1933 The one "neigh" appears, at least given the tenor of the discussion in the transcript, to have been Mr. Quijano from Panama, who at one point implored his colleagues to reconsider:
Mr. Quijano considered that the article should be adopted at once. The Commission had included in the Declaration all the articles it considered necessary, with the sole exception of that one. The article was clear, and it was undeniable that everyone had the right to submit petitions to a competent authority and to obtain a response; that right was provided for in the constitutions of all the American nations and in those of many others. The Commission could not be making a mistake in including such a provision in the Declaration. (Schabas 2013 (Schabas : 1933 Alas, it was not to be. The unnumbered right was never numbered and incorporated into the UDHR. One apparent result is that the right's inclusion in national constitutions has significantly declined. Our sense is that subsequent national constitutions -the principle legal device for enforcing rights -would be different. They might have fewer rights, a smaller core of consensual rights, and -outside the core -a different cast of elective rights. Our goal in future iterations of this paper is to estimate this difference more precisely, using the instrumental variables we introduce here. The idea is to paint the likely profile of an average constitution in 2015, conditional upon the UDHR's absence, and to compare this profile to the one we observe today. A subsequent step might be to estimate differences in societal outcomes -something perhaps more meaningful --but it may not be necessary to project the effects too distantly. For those of us that are persuaded that written constitutions can serve as important devices for constraining and inducing state action, effects on the written word may be enough. 
